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Chapter J0
Public Pension Plan Efficiency
Ping-Lung Hsin and Olivia S. Mitchell
Population aging and fiscal stress are exerting pressures on public retire-
ment systems worldwide. Finding ways to reduce the high costs of public
pensions without contributing to a serious reduction in the quality of
retirement services is an issue of public concern in the United States,
where aging patterns combined with early retirement trends are exerting
pressure on state and local government pension plans. When viewed
against the backdrop of probably limited opportunities for collecting
new public revenue, public sector plan managers are increasingly focus-
ing on ways to make their pension plans function more efficiently. The
topic is also one of central concern to policymakers elsewhere in the
developed world and increasingly a prime target for reform in develop-
ing countries (Reid and Mitchell 1995).
This chapter investigates the determinants of pension administrative
costs in state and local pension plans in the United States, seeking to
draw lessons which might improve the design and governance of public
pensions both in developed and in developing countries. In particular,
streamlining public employee pensions without contributing to serious
reductions in the quality of retirement services is a topic of great cur-
rent interest. For example, some policymakers argue that governments
should contract-out pension services, following the path taken by Chile
in 1981 when that country turned most of its retirement system over to
private (albeit heavily regulated) pension managers. While in Chile the
privatization approach appeared to be quite costly initially, plan costs
have declined oflate (Reid and Mitchell 1995). Administrative costs may
also vary depending on how the pension plan is organized and managed.
For instance, in the United States there is a great deal of variation across
public plans in terms of how their fiduciary boards are constituted, who
authorizes their administrative cost budgets, and what kinds of partici-
pants are included in the plans. These differences in structure may influ-
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ence administrative efficiency of the plans and could afford insights into
how changing the way plans are structured could help save taxpayer
money. Each of these possibilities is examined in the analysis below.'
Prior Studies of Pension System
Administrative Efficiency
Previous research on pension administration costs has been mainly lim-
ited to simple multivariate analysis ofprivate pension plans. The hypothe-
sis examined in the few available analyses is straightforward, namely, that
administrative costs rise less than proportionately as the size of the pen-
sion plan grows because certain inputs such as computer, accounting,
payroll, or money management systems are lumpy investments. As a re-
sult, one would expect that as a pension system expands, plan costs
would rise less than proportionately. Ifit could be proved that there are
substantial cost savings from larger pension plans, this would suggest in
the public sector, at least, that efforts to merge and coalesce larger
groups of participants and plan assets could save taxpayer money. Con-
versely, breaking up large pension pools would be likely to make retire-
ment systems more, not less, cost effective.
The first empirical study in the US context to examine the scale econo-
mies hypothesis in pension plans was an early piece by Caswell (1976)
who focused on a subset of private-sector plans in the construction in-
dustry. These were multi-employer plans, called this because they were
jointly managed by employers and unions in a collectively bargained en-
vironment. That study used multivariate linear regression to relate pen-
sion administration costs to two separate outputs-the total number of
pension participants, and the total value of pension assets. Only one set
of results was reported, namely, with regard to costs as they changed with
the number of participants; the elasticity of costs with respect to the
number of participants proved to be significantly less than unity, equal-
ing 0.80. The study also indicated that costs rose with the number of
employers covered by the system, holding constant the number of pen-
sion participants. In other words, having more pension sponsors appar-
ently complicates pension administration. A final interesting finding in
Caswell's study was that the pension system's administrative expendi tures
were not significantly affected by using in-house administrative staff com-
pared to externally contracted agencies.
Some years later a follow-up study on multiemployer plans was carried
out by Mitchell and Andrews (1981), who drew on Form 5500 pension
plan reports filed in 1975 with the Department of Labor. Those autilOrs
estimated a Cobb-Douglas cost function, and found evidence for scale
1
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economies in that administrative expenses rose by only 0.80 if the size
of the participant pool rose by 1 percent. Similar results were obtained
by Cooper, Crabb, and Carlsen (1984) who also used a Cobb-Douglas
cost function to estimate the determinants of pension system operating
expenses. That analysis concluded that for each of three measures evalu-
ated (participants, net pension assets, and employers' annual contribu-
tions) there appeared to be scale economies. Finally, Parsons (1992)
recently reiterated the conclusion of scale economies for private pension
plans, this time using aggregate rather than micro (plan-level) data.
The finding that there are substantial scale economies in private-sector
pensions has not yet been extensively evaluated using plan-level infor-
mation for public pension plans, nor has much multivariate analysis been
undertaken. An aggregate data effort collected cross-national information
on social security systems in a large number ofdeveloped and developing
coun tries and found wide variation in administration costs across that set
of nations. For example. Social Security administration costs averaged
only 2 to 3 percent of benefit expenditures in the United States Social
Security system and likewise across the large plans hosted by the OECD
nations. In contrast, for the far smaller systems of Latin America and the
Caribbean nations, social security administration costs averaged 28 per-
cent of benefit expenditures (Mitchell et a1. 1993, 1994). While little in-
formation is available with which to conduct multivariate analysis of scale
economies internationally, two exploratory studies are supportive of the
scale economies hypothesis (Reid and Mitchell 1995;James and Palacios
1995). Thus far, however, no careful multivariate state and local analysis
has been carried out, a subject we turn to in the next section.
Measuring Administrative Efficiency
of PUblic Employee Retirement Systems
Having found that the hypothesis of scale economies is confirmed for
private pension plans and national social security programs, the ques-
tion we turn to next is whether the hypothesis holds for US state and
local pension plans as well. A related question we ask is whether the
simpler cost studies of the past may have erred in assuming that pension
plans are managed as efficiently as possible. Conventional cost studies
assume that an institution operates on the feasible and economically ef-
ficient frontier with minimum possible expenditures, given the size of
the pension plan as well as technological and environmental factors.
This assumption may not hold in the public sector, since public retire-
ment systems are generally not subject to direct market competition. If
public pension plans operate far inside the administratively efficient
190 Public Pension Plan Efficiency
frontier, we would be led to ask how substantial this inefficiency gap is
and what factors might be associated with substantial inefficiencies. In
the analysis below we test for this possibility directly.
The data set used for this study is known as the 1992 PENDAT data file,
a cross-sectional survey of more than 300 public employee retirement
systems (PERS) that together administer almost 500 state and local pen-
sion plans in the United States (Zorn 1993). Depending on the state,
these plans cover public employees of all kinds, including judges and
teachers, police and firefighters, among others. In 1992, these public
retirement systems as a whole held assets of US $791 billion and covered
10.6 million active members.2 To assess the relative importance of ad-
ministrative expenditures within these public employee pension plans, it
is useful to note that such costs averaged 12 percent of public employers'
annual pension contributions, 01" 9 percent of total pension contribu-
tions (including employees' payments) in 1992.
The Model
In this study, public pension plan administrative efficiency is evaluated
by measuring the gap between frontier and actual administrative costs.
The term "frontier costs" refers to the minimum possible cost for a given
amount of output and given input prices, and is denoted as Co. If a pen-
sion plan's actual administrative costs were C" where C L exceeded Co,
tllen that PERS would be judged not to be on the efficiency frontier.
Efficiency comparisons across different PERS can be effected by compar-
ing the ratio of their frontier to their actual costs, known as a "Farrell-
type" efficiency measure, C"IC, (Farrell 1957). By contrast, if a public
pension system's Farrell measure Co/C, is higher than average, this
would imply that that system was administered more efficiently. A public
pension system on the frontier will have C"IC, equal to unity.
Reported costs C, are reported in the PENDAT file, but the frontier
measure Co is unobservable and must be estimated. This can be derived
using a "stochastic frontier cost function" approach for estimation pur-
poses, a technique which has been applied to measure the efficiency of
other public services in recent years but not for public pensions.s This
approach begins by specifying a general multiproduct cost function:
eli = f(Y, W; a) + "i'
where C'i represents the actual administrative costs of a public retire-
ment system i, Vis a vector of system outputs, Wis a vector of input prices
faced by each system, a is a vector of parameters, and € i is the error term.
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For estimation purposes the model assumes that 10; is made up of two
independent components:
Ej = Vi + U .. , where U i 2': o.
The key to this approach is contained in the specification of the com-
posite error term 10;. The first component of the disturbance, Vi' captures
random error and is posited to reflect exogenous independent changes
in pension administration costs. The second error term, U;, captures sys-
tematic technical factors that may lead to administrative costs exceeding
the minimum frontier. If U i = 0, then the retirement system i is said to
be on the efficiency frontier.
To estimate the model, it is necessary to specifY the exact functional
form ofj(Y, W; a), and the distribution of 10;. Administrative expendi-
tures of a PERS are incurred in producing two types of services: invest-
ment management and participant services. Of course in each case, it is
somewhat difficult to define the PERS ultimate output. Nevertheless,
following prior analysts, we identify two intermediate measures of out-
put that are properly related to administrative expenditures: the value
of assets held by the system (ASSETS), and the number of participants
(PARTI), including both currently employed and retired members
(Mitchell and Andrews 1981). Expenditures for investment manage-
ment increase with the value of assets, but when scale economies exist, a
system with more assets will be observed to incur lower administrative
expenses per dollar invested. Similarly, expenditures rise with the num-
ber of participants, but economies of scale will be said to exist if an in-
crease in the number of participants produces less than a proportionate
increase in administrative expenses.
In addition to these two variables, public pension administrative ex-
penditul"es are also likely to be influenced by the composition of partici-
pants and the complexity and quality of pension services provided. Thus
serving retired participants may be more expensive than serving active
participants (Caswell 1976; Mitchell and Andrews 1981). Extra expenses
are also incurred for serving disabled retirees because of the necessary
medical examinations. We also posit that administrative expenditures in-
crease with the complexity of pension services, represented here by the
number of pension plans administered by a PERS (NUMPLAN).' Typi-
cally, different state and local pension plans administered by the same
PERS are from different localities or are negotiated with different unions
(Zorn 1993). Required age and service years for receiving retirement
benefits are also different among these pension plans.5 Therefore, the
more pension plans a PERS administers, the more complicated its pen-
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sian services are likely to be. Finally, we seek to measure the quality of
pension services by the annualized rate of return on pension assets over
the previous five years (YSROR)." Other things being equal, adminis-
trative expenditures may increase with pension service quality, because
more and better inputs are used.
As in most cross-section cost function studies, input prices are not ex-
plicitly included in the analysis. Their omission from the PENDAT file is
probably not serious because the most important wage costs for public
pension systems cover the services of actuaries, lawyers, accountan ts, and
financial advisors. Salaries for these professionals are nationally com-
petitive and hence are not expected to vary systematically across systems
(Mitchell and Andrews 1981).
To summarize, the empirical formula employed in examining public
pension plans' administrative costs is expressed as a log-linear cost func-
tion: 7
In(C1i ) = ao + a,ln(PARTI,J + a 7 In(ASSETS i ) + a,SERRATE i
+ a,DISRATE, + a,NUMPLAN i + a,Y5ROR, + E i (lA)
where
eli is the actual administrative expenditure of the retirement system I;
and SERRATE and DISRATE represent the fractions of normal retirees
and disabled retirees in the total pension participant pool.
ASSETS and PARTI are highly correlated, causing problems of colli-
nearity when both are included in the model. Hence we multiply assets
per participant, ASTPER by PARTl, and rearrange equation (l.A) as fol-
lows:"
In(Ci) = an + a,ln(PARTI i ) + a 71n(PARTI!ASTPER,) + a,SERRATEi
+ a,DISRATEi+ a,NUMPLAN, + a,Y5ROR, + E i
= all + a,'ln(PARTI i ) + a,ln(ASTPER,J + a,SERRATE i
+ a,DISRATEi + a,NUMPLAN i + a,Y5ROR, + E i (I.B)
where a/ = a, + a2'
It will be readily seen that this equation is a Cobb-Douglas type cost
function; thus, coefficients on output measures, a, and a 2 , represent
output cost elasticity. The incremental proportion of administrative ex-
penditures caused by a 1 percent increase in the number of participants
is represented by a,'. These incremental expenditures include expenses
for non-investment services to the added participants and the expenses
of managing the assets maintained for these participants. The incre-
mental proportion of administrative expenditures caused by a 1 percent
increase in the value of assets is a2' The difference between a I' and a2
is the cost elasticity with respect to non-investment services provided to
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participants. Economies of scale in public pension administration would
be said to exist if a I' is less than one.
The administrative cost frontier of retirement system i is derived by
setting the error term U i , which is part of E i , to zero in equation (l.B).
Since the determination of the cost frontier still involves the noise error
term, v" the cost frontier specified in this setting is called "stochastic."9
Following Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977), we assume that U is drawn
from a half-normal and v is from a normal distribution. In this event the
model can be estimated by maximizing likelihood approach, and the
Farrell-type efficiency indicator of retirement system i, CO';C li , is equal
to exp (-u i ). Although U, is unobservable, the expectation of Ui, condi-
tioned on E i can also be estimated. iO
Results
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics on all variables of interest for the
PENDAT state anq, local pension plan sample. In these data, the measure
TABLE 1 Multivariate Analysis of Administrative Expenditures of Public
Employee Retirement Systems
Mean FrontierFunction
(S.D.) Estimate
Dependent variable
COST (US$K)
In (administrative expenditures)
Independent variables
PARTI
In (N. active & ret. participants)
ASSETS (US $M)
In (mkt assets per participant)
SERRATE (%)
Normal retirees to total participants
DISRATE (%)
Disabled retirees to total participants
NUMPLAN
N. pension plans per PERS
YSROR (%)
Annualized rate ofreturn-5 year av
Constant
Log-likelihood ratio
No. of pension systems
Source: 1992 PENDAT file; see text.
**Indicates significance at 0.05 level.
6.95
(1.88)
8.94
(2.34)
-2.92
(0.72)
24.35
(11.41)
2.72
(3.61)
1.38
(1.00)
10.83
(1.69)
0.74**
(0.03)
0.49**
(0.08)
-0.004
(0.006)
0.02
(0.02)
0.03
(0.10)
0.02
(0.03)
1.03**
(0.63)
-230.93
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of pension plan participants per system is computed as the sum of par-
ticipants across all individual plans in each retirement system. This
measure includes active and retired members, but not vested terminated
members, due to the way the survey asked the question; nevertheless,
since job turnover is uncommon in the public sector, excluding vested
terminated members is not a matter of concern. Pension system assets
are measured as the reported market value of each pension system's
holdings. Administrative expenditures of public employee retirement
systems are taken from annual administrative budgets reported by each
pension system.
After excluding systems with missing values for these key variables, the
sample for analysis consists of 197 state and local pension systems, cov-
ering a total of 272 separate retirement plans. II The first column of
Table I presents means and standard deviations of key variables. Per-plan
administrative expenditures for a state/ local retirement system averaged
about US $130 per participant per year, a cost that compares favorably
to median administrative expenditures per participant in large private
defined benefit pension plans of about US $110 (in 1992 dollars).!2
Maximum likelihood estimates of the coefficients from the efficiency
model (the a's) appear in the second column ofTable 1.!3 Of most inter-
est is the estimated coefficient on (the log of the number of) partici-
pants, which is about 0.74. The fact that it is substantially less than 1
implies t\1at scale economies are powerful in the public pension arena.
Specifically, a 1 percentage point increase in plan participants would be
predicted to increase public plan administrative expenditures by 0.74 of
a percentage point, holding assets per participant constant. This number
is remarkably close to the 0.80 figure reported in the private pension
arena by Caswell (1976), Mitchell and Andrews (1981), and Cooper,
Crabb and Carlsen (1984).
Even greater economies are revealed in the estimated coefficient on
(the log of) the market value of assets per participant. The term is equal
to 0.49, suggesting that a plan \\~th I percentage point additional assets
would be expected to have costs rise by less than half a percent. This is
not quite twice the same elasticity found for private plans (0.27; see
Mitchell and Andrews 1981). Using the derivation above, we compute
that administrative expenditures also rise less than one-for-{me Mth re-
spect to non-investment services, where the elasticity is equal to 0.25 (cal-
culated as the difference between 0.74 and 0.49). This cost elasticity is
about half that estimated for private pension plans (0.56; see Mitchell
and Andrews 1981). While the overall pattern of results between the pri-
vate and public plans seems similar, there is clear evidence of some dif-
ferences between the way public and private pension agencies allocate
money management expenditures. I. In general these results confirm
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that there are significant economies of scale in public pension adminis-
tration for both investment and non-investment services.
Another conclusion from Table 1 is that there is evidence of substan-
tial inefficiency in the data. Estimated exp (-u) has an average value of
65 percent; the farther is this coefficient from 1.0, the less efficient is the
pension plan, In other words, as much as one-third of pension admin-
istrative expenditures aloe attributable to inefficiency using this meth-
odology. Whether this number is larger or smaller than other similar
institutions is not known, but public plan efficiency in administration
appears somewhat less than that of other publicly managed institutions
in the United States. For example, in local police departments, about a
quarter of local administrative costs have been attributed to inefficiency
(Davis and Hayes 1993), and almost one-fifth in city government offices
(Hayes and Chang 1990). Research on heavily regulated United States
reports that inefficiency measured in the same manner seems to be
roughly 15 percent of costs (Zuckerman, Hadley, and lezzoni 1994; ew-
house 1994), The extent of inefficiency in public pension plans appears
comparable to, or even a bit lower than, levels reported by researchers
studying the heavily regulated property liability insurers, where up to
45 percent of costs are due to inefficiency (Berger, Cummins, and Weiss
1995) .
Turning to other results in Table 1, the findings offer no support for
the hypothesis that public plan administrative expenditures differ de-
pending on the type of workers covered. This is different from results in
the private sector reported by Mitchell and Andrews (1981), who found
that services provided to retirees were more expensive. Table 1 also
shows that administrative performance in the public pension environ-
ment is not sensitive to the number of pension plans administered, a
finding which differs from Caswell's (1976) analysis of the construction
industry. Finally, the investment performance of public pension assets
has no statistically significant influence on administrative expenditures,
although the coefficient of Y5ROR is positive.
Determinants of Pension Administrative Efficiency
In this section we move from documenting the extent of pension admin-
istrative inefficiency to a closer examination of particular institutional
features that seem to be associated with inefficient outcomes in the pen-
sion plan arena. One observation is that public retirement systems differ
according to who is scheduled to pay for administrative expenditures
incurred in running the plans. In nearly two-thirds of the PENDAT sys-
tems, these expenses must be paid out of plan investment earnings or
from pension contributions, while in the remaining one-third of the sys-
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tems such expenditures are paid out of general revenues by the sponsor-
ing employer. We hypothesize that pension boards may spend more per
unit of output if they are permitted to authorize their own budgets, an
effect which could be enhanced if the board need not cover its costs out
of its own budget.
A second aspect we investigate is public plan governance, namely, who
is responsible for the authorization of pension benefit levels, contribu-
tion, and funding decisions in a given plan. In about half the retirement
systems under study, public pension administrative budgets are autho-
rized by the governing boards of the pension systems themselves. In the
other half of the cases, regulations require the state legislature or a spe-
cific outside council to authorize administrative budgets. Whether this
oversight structure has a potent effect on administrative efficiency is ex-
plored below empirically.
A different dimension along which pension board governance varies
pertains to the makeup of the board itself. PERS trustees are either
elected by pension participants, appointed by governor, or serve ex offi-
cio, and board composition varies a great deal across systems. On aver-
age, one-third of board trustees are elected by pension participants,
while the other two-thirds are appointed or serve ex officio. In earlier
analysis we found that pension funding and investment performance
was somewhat lower when participants served on their pension system's
board (Mitchell and Hsin 1994). It may be that having participant-
elected members on pension boards also reduces measured pension ad-
ministrative efficiency. On the other hand, participant-elected trustees
may have fewer incentives to expand administrative budgets because
they may be less concerned with their own power, prestige, or patronage
and more concerned with the welfare of their constituents. Therefore,
the net effect of the fraction of participant-elected trustees on pension
administrative efficiency is an empirical matter.
Pension administrative efficiency may also differ between state and lo-
cal governments, as argued by analysts who contend that state pension
plan staffers are better trained than are staff members of local plans
(Bleakney 1972). Whether this is true can be examined directly by inves-
tigating whether state pension plans prove to be administered more ef-
ficiently than local plans: in the PENDAT data file, about one-fifth of
public employee retirement systems are administered by state govern-
mental units whereas local governmental units provide day-t<Hiay ad-
ministration of the remaining systems. The type of employees may also
be important along the same lines; more educated participants, such as
teachers, might be in a better position to monitor plan expenses as com-
pared to a broader mix of covered workers. Similarly, it may be that pub-
lic sector unions exert a watchdog function over costs, in which case it
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would be expected that plans covering unionized employees would ex-
perience measured efficiency (Mitchell and Smith 1994).
A final aspect of interest is the possible influence of contracting-out
on public pension plan administrative efficiency. One form this takes
among US public pension systems is that boards frequently hire profes-
sional money managers to invest fund assets. Many PERS have in-house
investment staff, of course, but it is common for a public system to use at
least one external private investment manager or performance measure-
ment service (Mitchell and Hsin 1994), and, in some instances, all of the
investment decisions are handled exclusively by external agents. Advo-
cates of privatization suggest that con tracting out may improve efficiency
in providing public services because of different incentives driving pri-
vate versus public sector managers." Thus it is worthwhile investigating
whether contracting out pension investment services to private agents
improves public pension plans' administrative efficiency.
An examination of the influence of these several administrative fea-
tures on pension administrative efficiency is facilitated using the follow-
ing multivariate linear regression model:
exp(-u i ) = {3o + {3,EXTPURE, + {32BUDPAYOK, + {3,BUDOK i
+ {3,PAYOKi + {3"BDELMEM; + {3oSTADMIN;
+ {3,TCHRPLAN, + {3.POFIPLAN, + {3,UNIONRT, + K, (2)
where exp( -u,) is the efficiency indicator derived in the previous sec-
tion; EXTPURE is set to 1 when the public plan's investment manage-
ment function is handled exclusively by external private contractors
(else 0); BUDPAYOK is set to 1 if the plan's board both sets the adminis-
trative budget and must pay for it via pension investment earnings or
contributions (else 0); BUDOKis equal to 1 if the plan's board authorizes
administrative budgets but is not required to pay for it out of plan reve-
nues (else 0); PAYOK is equal to 1 if the plan's board must pay for the
administrative budgets are but cannot authorize administrative expenses
(else 0); BDELMEM is the fraction of participant-elected trustees on the
pension board; STADMIN is equal to 1 if the retirement system is admin-
istered by a state governmental unit (else 0); TCHRPLAN is equal to 1 if
the major participants of the system are teachers or school employees
(else 0); POFlPLAN is equal to 1 if the plan covers mainly police or fire-
fighters (else 0); UNlONRT is the fraction of active members of the sys-
tem represented by unions; and K is assumed to be a normally distributed
error term.
This multivariate model is estimated using ordinary least squares, and
descriptive statistics of all variables used are given in Table 2. Here we
note that, across the systems under study, about two-thirds used external
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TABLE 2 Multivariate Analysis ofAdministrative Efficiency of Public Employee
Retirement System
Mean OLS
(S.D.) Estimate
Dependent Variable:
exp( -u)
Efficiency ratio
Independent Variables:
EXTPURE
External money managers only
BUDPAYOK
Admin. budget authorized & paid by pension
board
BUDOK
Admin. budget authorized by board but paid
by employer
PAYOK
Admin. budget authorized by employer but
paid by pension board
BDELMEM
% of pension board elected by participants
TCHRPLAN
Teacher/school employee retirement system
POFIPLAN
Police/fire fighter retirement system
STADMIN
Retirement system admin. by state government
UNIONRT
% of actives rep. by union
Constant
R-squared
N. pension systems
SauTee: 1992 PENDAT file; see text.
*t-value ~ 1.65
't-value:e: 1.96
65.01
(8.73)
0.64
(0.48)
0.42
(0.49)
0.18
(0.39)
0.23
(0.42)
35.27
(25.74)
0.14
(0.35)
0.16
(0.37)
0.20
(0.40)
73.95
(43.35)
2.48*
(1.38)
-4.01 ,
(1.84)
-4.81 ,
(2.10)
0.68
(2.02)
0.014
(0.03)
1.33
(1.88)
-1.10
(1.78)
-1.87
(1.75)
0.012
(0.015)
64.82'
(2.14)
0.10
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money managers to handle exclusively their investment decisions. Pen-
sion boards both authorized and paid administrative budgets through
pension investment earnings or contributions in 42 percent of the retire-
ment systems; in another 23 percent of the cases boards paid administra-
tive expenses but did not authorize the budgets, and in 18 percent of the
cases the boards only authorized expenditures. In the remaining sys-
tems, the administrative budgets were neither authorized nor paid for by
pension boards. The averages also show that about one-third of public
pension board trustees are elected by pension participants, with most of
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the remaining trustees appointed or serving ex officio. Most of the ,"etire-
ment systems were general public employee plans, and only 14 percent
were teacher-only systems, with 16 percent police- or firefighter-only sys-
tems. Most plans included some members covered by unions, averaging
a 74 percent coverage rate across these PENDAT pension plans (state-
only systems were one-fifth of these plans).
Estimated parameters (f3's) appear in the second column of Table 2. '6
The first estimated coefficient, which is positive and statistically sig-
nificant, indicates that plans are more efficient if they contract out
investment services to private money managers. This offers convincing
evidence that public pension plan administrative efficiency is improved
by using external investment managers, holding other factors constant.
Above we hypothesized that efficiency will be lower when plan adminis-
trative cost budgets are authOlized by pension boards; this hypothesis is
upheld in the data as is evident from the two negative and statistically
coefficients on these variables. Specifically, we find that granting pension
boards authority over their administrative budgets decreases systems'
administrative efficiency. This effect persists, and is indeed somewhat
stronger, when administrative budgets can be charged to a sponsoring
employer, as opposed to having the system cover its own costs directly.
Turning to other estimation results, there appears to be no systematic
linkage between a public pension plan's degree of administrative effi-
ciency and board makeup, as indicated by the coefficient on participant-
elected board members. There were also no significant differences in
pension administrative efficiency discerned between state versus local
retirement systems, or more or less unionized plans, or between plans
covering different types of employees. In general, the relatively low
R-squared shows that the overall variance in plan relative efficiency is
only partly associated with hypothesized explanatory variables.
Implications
To explore further the magnitudes of these estimation results, we simu-
late how public pension administrative costs would be posited to change
if plans could be structured more efficiently. To do this we use statistically
significant coefficients in Table 2 combined with estimated inefficiency
magnitudes from Table I. The exercise to arrive at the cost savings per
plan that would result from greater administrative efficiency is as follows:
assume that on average 35 percent of all plans' administrative costs are
inefficient based on the frontier function model; then multiply this frac-
tion by the average dollar figure devoted to pension system administra-
tion by public plans in the PENDAT sample. As Table 3 points out, an
average plan would be expected to save approximately US $370,000 per
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TABLE 3 Simulation Analysis of Public Pension Plan Administrative
Expenditures
Public Pension Management Technique
1. If all state and local plans were
administered on the efficiency
frontier.
2. If all state and local plans
contracted out their entire
investment activity to private money
managers.
3. If all state and local plans'
administrative budgets were
authorized and paid for by pension
boards.
4. If all state and local administrative
budgets were authorized by pension
boards, but paid for by the public
employer.
Yields Change in Annual Plan
AdministrativeExpenditures
Pension administration costs would
fall by US $365 K per plan/US
$876 M PERS-wide.
Pension administration costs would
fall by US $25 K per plan/US
$6 M PERS-wide.
Pension administration costs would
rise by US $41 K per plan/US$roo M PERS-wide.
Pension administration costs would
rise by US $50 K per plan/ US
$120 M PERS-wide.
Source: Derived from coefficient estimates in Table 2 and median per-plan administrative
expenditures of US $1 M per plan.
year (in 1992 dollars) by operating on the efficiency frontier. This trans-
lates into estimated cost savings for the approximately 2,400 public pen-
sion plans in the country of about US $876 million in administrative
expenses. 17
What ifexisting plans switched investment practices and utilized exter-
nal money managers exclusively? Based on the figures given above, the
average public pension system would save about US $25,000 per year in
administrative expenditures by contracting out all investment services
to private money managers as efficient as those used by plans in the
PENDAT sample. Taking this figure to the PERS universe, it is estimated
that about US $6 million per year could be saved from such a strategy.
Alternatively, what might be the result of changing pension board au-
thority so as to permit all PERS boards to authorize, and pay for, their
own administrative budgets? The results in Table 3 indicate, that for
the average public plan, this move would increase administrative costs
US $41 ,000 per year. Averaging this figure across all PERS, administrative
expenditures would be predicted to rise by about US $100 million per
year. If, instead, PERS boards' powers were restricted to authorizing ad-
ministrative budgets, but administrative costs were charged to and paid
for by the sponsoring employer, administrative expenditures would be
predicted to rise by US $120 million per year.
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Conclusions
Reducing the high costs of public pensions without cutting the quality of
the retirement services provided by these plans is an important issue of
public concern everywhere. This chapter has examined a new data set
on state and local pension plans in the United States in order to investi-
gate the determinants of pension administrative costs. Our goal has been
to draw lessons which might improve the design and governance of pub-
lic pensions both in developed and in developing counuies.
This analysis of a large number of US state and local pension plans
reveals that, on average, administrative expenditures per participant are
high but not apparently higher than in private pension plans. In both
cases, to take advantage of scale economies, pension plans could benefit
from merging and coalescing into larger pension pools.
We have also offered evidence that pension administrative costs could
be substantially reduced if the systems were operated more efficiently. A
multivariate frontier function approach was used to show that, on aver-
age, the public pension systems examined here operated at about 65 per-
cent efficiency, suggesting that substantial cost savings might be derived
from better management.
In examining patterns of public pension inefficiency, we found evi-
dence that efficiency is higher when administrative budgets are autho-
rized by a group other than the pension board. We also find that
contracting out pension investment services to private money managers
improves administrative efficiency. Finally, the extent of public plan ad-
ministrative efficiency varies widely among PERS. While our model re-
vealed only some of the variation, there remain many other factors
influencing public plans' administrative efficiency. To investigate these
factors, more comprehensive data must be gathered, including addi-
tional information on administrative structure and control. That it is
critical to do so is obvious, given the increasing authority that the federal
government is devolving to states and eventually to locally run public-
sector institutions.
Opinions are those of the authors and not the institutions with whom
they are affiliated.
Notes
1. We recognize that reducing administrative costs will nOt save insolvent and
chronically underfunded pension systems; see Reid and Mitchell (1995) and
Hsin and Mitchell (1994) for further discussion of this issue.
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2. The public employee retirement systems included in the PENDAT data
file represent the vast majority of state and local pension participants, covering
86 percent of total state and local pension plan assets and 83 percent of active
pension plan members. Nevertheless the fact that the survey does not include all
plans must be kept in mind when interpreting results; these plans are among the
largest in the nation and perhaps are better managed than some smaller systems.
Previous research on public pension funding outcomes using this data set (Hsin
and Mitchell 1994) suggested no potent effect of selectivity bias, however.
3. The stochastic frontier cost approach has been applied in assessing the
efficiency of several public-senor activities including municipal government
(Hayes and Chang 1990; Deller and Rudnick 1992) and police departments
(Davis and Hayes 1993). An early survey of the frontier function approach ap-
pears in Forsund, Lovel, and Schmidt (1980); recent developments in this ap-
proach appear in Bauer (1990).
4. This follows Caswell's specification for measuring private pension plan
complexity.
5. The actuarial assumptions and the benefit accrual rates are usually the
same for state and local pension plans administered by the same PERS.
6. We recognize that the service quality provided by a PERS cannot be rep-
resented solely by the rate of return on pension assets. For instance, some might
argue that covered participants' satisfaction level might be a good measure of
system performance. However in the PENDAT survey, the plan's rate of return is
the only performance measure available in this data set.
7. We also investigated a translog cost function. However, the hypothesis that
all the coefficients of the quadratic terms are equal to 0 cannot be rejected at the
1 percent significance level.
8. A different way to handle the collinearity problem is to include PART! and
ASSETS separately in two different models (e.g., Caswell 1976; Cooper et al.
1984). The cost elasticity for investment and non-investment services, however,
cannot be distinguished using this approach.
9. A different type of cost frontier excludes the error term and is called "de-
terministic" (Greene 1980). The advantage of the stochastic specification is that
estimation of the cost frontier is less likely to be influenced by data outliers. For
a comparison between the two cost frontier approaches see Forsund, Lovell, and
Schmidt (1980).
10. ForestimationofE(u,iE',) seeJondrewetal. (1982).
11. The PENDAT sample is diminished by almost two-fifths due to item non-
response. However, omitted plans were very small as a rule; systems analyzed still
held US $691 billion in assets, only 12 percent less than the initial group ofsys-
terns surveyed. As a consequence, results reported here probably represent
upper-bound estimates of public plan efficiency.
12. Expenditures per participant in private multiemployer pension plans aver-
aged about US $50/year (1992$); see Caswell (1976), Mitchell and Andrews
(1981), Turner and Beller (1989), and Reid and Mitchell (1995). The gap in
administrative expenditures between public and private pension plans may be
larger than described above, however, once different accounting systems in pub-
lic versus private sectors are taken into consideration. Private pension systems are
likely to report most administrative expenditures, including operating expenses
and such expenses as building and capital depreciation, but these may not be
properly accounted for by public pension plan administrations. Public plans
might also understate their costs if they share equipment or offices with other
Ping-Lung Hsin and Olivia S. Mitchell 203
government branches. Hence administrative expenditures reported by public
pension agencies almost certainly understate the full cost of resources devoted to
providing pension services, a point that should be kept in mind when comparing
the administrative efficiency of public and private pension systems; c.f. Reid and
Mitchell (1995). The US $130 median figure (= exp(6.95)/exp(8.94)) in the
text is higher than the average of US $260 derived by dividing costs by participant
by plan. Because outliers thus strongly influence the simple averages, we use me-
dians in the discussion below.
13. Some may question whether the regression results are biased since some
portion of the administrative costs are not fully reported in plans that have been
partially or fully contracted out. However Paul Zorn (personal communication)
suggests this is a modest problem, and we conclude that the regression results
might be biased, but the bias is not serious.
14. These differences could also be the result of differences in model specifi-
cation; for instance, collinearity between output levels of investment and non-
investment services was not addressed by Mitchell and Andrews (1981).
15. The World Bank (1994) summarizes the case for privatizing or contracting
out public pension plans. For a general discussion of public/private differences
in the production process and their effects on incentive structures and monitor-
ing see Hirsch (1991), who notes that owners of a private-sector production pro-
cess have incentives to monitor quality because they can transfer their ownership
and reap the residual profits. In the public sector, however, voters (owners of the
public production processes) cannot generally transfer their ownership, which
discourages profit seeking and hence monitoring. Although they can reap the
residual profits in paying lower taxes, these profits must be shared with all the
residents in ajurisdiction, regardless ofwhether they pay the costs of monitoring.
As a consequence, the costs of producing goods may be higher in public than in
private production. For a discussion of the impact of bureaucrats' behavior on
efficiency see Niskanen (1971).
16. In alternate analyses (results not presented here) we estimated models
which included fewer variables in the first-stage and more in the second-stage
equation. However, results for included variables did not differ from those pre-
sented in Tables 1 and 2.
17. This computation uses median (unlogged) administrative costs per PERS
of US $1 million in 1994 (exp 6.95). Outliers make average administrative costs
higher, at about US $4 million but the text uses the more representative amount.
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